Georgia Power Company convinced regulators and their project partners that Vogtle Units 3&4 would be built on budget ($14 billion) and on schedule despite the example of Vogtle Units 1&2 that were $5 billion over budget and 5 years behind schedule. Vogtle Units 3&4 are now expected to cost $36 billion (including financing costs but not yet including $2 billion for decommissioning costs) and begin operations 8 years behind schedule. If the dollars spent on Vogtle Units 3&4 had been used for solar, even at the very high cost of solar in 2009, Georgians would have already saved $2.5 billion in fuel costs through 2023. Instead, each Georgia Power Company residential customer has paid $1,000 before the first kWh of electricity was generated at Vogtle Units 3&4.

Ratepayer Robbery – The True Cost of Plant Vogtle is a research and communication effort designed to promote public understanding and civic accountability. What is meant by accountability? That means holding the Georgia Legislature, the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC), and Georgia Power/Southern Nuclear accountable for decision-making that reflects malfeasance, corporate greed, and commission incompetence and has imposed scandalous and continuous rate increases on Georgia customers. Although the Public Service Commission’s role is in part to protect consumers from monopoly power, they have been woefully remiss in their duties to the people of Georgia. This report will explain how, and why.

Why were cost overruns so extreme? Four key reasons:

1. Southern Company chose Westinghouse’s incomplete design for the AP1000 reactor with claims they could nish the design as the project progressed. This caused a cascade of problems and cost overruns.

2. The AP1000 reactor design was modular with construction supposedly taking place onsite, but modular parts didn't work and factories had to be set up on-site to rework the modules.

3. There was ineffective and poor-quality construction management.

A few examples:

a. In 2012, the rebar was installed incorrectly and had to be redone.

b. In 2013, the base mat concrete did not adhere to design specs and had to be redone.

c. IEEE guidelines for electrical work were not followed and had to be redone.

d. Component failure rates of 80% from leaving components exposed to weather.

4. There was poor quality executive management and judgement.

A few examples:

a. Shaw Industries was hired as the contractor and had no experience in nuclear projects.

b. Both Westinghouse and Southern Nuclear provided materially inaccurate cost and schedule estimates. This false information caused a cascade of problems.

c. Southern Nuclear failed to achieve an integrated project schedule and averaged one day of delay for every day of construction throughout the project.